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TWENTY YEARS AFTER-
RENEWED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REQUIREMENT
EDWARD 1. SULLIVAN*
LAURENCE KRESSEL**
INTRODUCTION
The relationship of planning to land use regulations has been a
matter silently relegated, by the acquiescence of local government and
the judiciary, to the back-waters of planning law. Recent indications
suggest, however, that the planning and land use regulation rela-
tionship is, or soon will be, the subject of intensive legislative and
judicial concern. Several factors have prompted the renewed interest
in the comprehensive planning process: adverse judicial reaction to
ad hoc decision-making at the local level, often thought to be replete
with bias, ignorance and capriciousness;' concern for the environment
*Legal Counsel to the Governor of Oregon; Member, Oregon State Bar;
Affiliate of the American Institute of Planners; Member, American Society of
Planning Officials; B.A., St. John's University, 1966; Urban Studies Certificate,
Portland State University, 1974; M.A., Portland State University, 1972; J.D.,
Willamette University, 1969.
**B.A., Harpur College (S.U.N.Y.), 1966; M.S.W., University of Michigan,
1968; J.D., Lewis and Clark College, Northwestern School of Law, 1975.
1. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAm 79-83 (1966). For a case study of
rampant corruption in land use decision-making see Freilich & Larson, Conflicts
of Interest: A Model Statutory Proposal for the Regulation of Municipal Trans-
actions, 38 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 373, 390-98 (1970). See also Sullivan, From
Kroner to Fasano: An Analysis of Judicial Review of Land Use Regulation in
Oregon, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 358, 359-69 (1974).
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and an effort to prevent its destruction, 2 especially in sensitive areas;"
attempts by citizen and planning groups, among others, to devise a
planning process that will inventory, analyze and build upon possible
alternatives in arriving at strategies and choices;4 and increasing state
participation in the planning process.5
The lack of clarity regarding the relationship between planning
and land use regulation in the United States was highlighted twenty
years ago in two articles by Professor Charles M. Haar. The first
and most widely quoted, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,"O
reviewed the legal history of the comprehensive plan requirement and
judicial reluctance to invalidate land use regulatory schemes that were
not predicated on such a plan. In the second article, The Master
Plan: An Impermanent Constitution,7 Haar advocated a relationship
between planning and zoning analogous to that between a constitution
and legislation in which the former provides legal parameters for the
latter.
Twenty years have passed since Haar advocated the importance
of the comprehensive plan. Part I of this Article reviews the case
law and legislation that have addressed the relationship between
planning and zoning to determine whether (and if so, what) mean-
ingful changes have occurred. This part also briefly recapitulates
the position taken by Haar in his first article and discusses three
trends in the law of planning and land use regulation. While the
conclusions of such an examination may be mixed, we believe there
2. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. III, 1973); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (1970); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18
(Supp. III, 1973).
3. See text at notes 161-85 infra (discussion on shoreline areas).
4. One of Oregon's goals is to devise a planning process that will inventory
resources, develop alternative policies, and outline policy choices made by the
relevant government. Goal No. 2 adopted by the Oregon Land Conservation and
Development Commission, December 27, 1974 (copy on file at State Library,
Salem, Oregon).
5. See notes 109-18 and accompanying text infra (discussion of Hawaii and
Vermont planning legislation).
6. Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARv. L. Rv.
1154 (1955).
7. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 353 (1955). Haar chose the constitutional analogy over alterna-
tives making the plan merely an advisory document.
[Vol. 9"33
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COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REQUIREMENT
is a fairly strong trend in judicial decisions, and an even more
definite trend in statutory law, toward Haar's concept of the compre-
hensive plan as a constitutional document for land use regulation.
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners,8 Baker v. City of Mil-
waukeeO and Oregon's statutory land use scheme10 are used to
illustrate the trend toward a broad expansion of the role of the
comprehensive plan.
Part II discusses the trend toward statewide land use planning.
Important examples of legislative activity in this area are briefly
outlined, including shorelands and wetlands protection acts. Part
III identifies areas of planning law likely to be of major concern in
the coming years: plan adoption and amendment, rationalization
of the planning process, and pre-emption of local control by both
state and federal land use planning activity.
I. THE ZONING-PLANNING ENIGMA
Disagreements over the role of planning in the land use regulatory
scheme inevitably lead back to the Standard Enabling Acts promul-
gated by the Department of Commerce in the 1920's. The proper
relationship between these Acts"' has never been analyzed to the satis-
faction of planners, lawyers or the judiciary. In 1926 the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) empowered local governing
bodies to adopt zoning regulations "in accordance with the compre-
hensive plan." 2 Two years later, the Standard City Planning Enabling
Act (SPEA) empowered planning commissions to adopt and carry
out a document variously referred to as the municipal plan, the
master plan, the official plan, and the city plan. 3 The question
arose whether the "plan" SPEA contemplated was intended to serve
8. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
9 ................. Ore ................. , 533 P.2d 772 (1975), aff'g in part, rev'g in part,
17 Ore. App. 384, 520 P.2d 479 (1974).
10. See text at notes 141-50 infra.
11. Professor Haar wistfully characterized the overall plan as the "parent" of
zoning, notwithstanding that the latter predated the former in the standard acts
and on the statute books of most American cities and counties. Haar, supra note
6, at 1154. See also text at note 16 infra.
12. ADVISORY Co usI. ON CITY PLANNING & ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter
cited as SZEA].
13. ADVISORY COMt. oN CITY' PLANNING & ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMIMERCE,
A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928) [hereinafter cited as SPEA].
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as the referent for SZEA's requirement of zoning in accordance with
the comprehensive plan. While an affirmative answer has logical
appeal, particularly to contemporary planners, one searches in vain
for substantiation of such an intent in the model enabling acts or
in their interpretation by the courts.' 4
The first stumbling block confronting a "planning precedes zoning"
argument is the untidy historical fact that planning followed zoning
in the standard enabling acts. 5 Moreover, the footnotes accompany-
ing the standard acts stressed a functional separation between planning
and decision-making that appeared to relegate the former to a dusty
14. See Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 364, 203 P.2d 37, 47-48
(Dist. Ct. App. 1949), holding that a separate master plan is the referent for
zoning "in accord with a plan."
15. Correspondingly, zoning preceded planning in most parts of the country.
See Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing
Flexible Planning and Zoning, 49 J. URBAN L. 65, 69 (1971). This point was
noted in the leading case of Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154,
131 A.2d 1 (1957), holding that zoning "in accordance with a comprehensive
plan" does not require a separate planning process. Reviewing the zoning-plan-
ning chronology, the court said:
Thus the historical development did not square with the orderly treatment
of the problem which present wisdom would recommend. And doubtless the
need for immediate measures led the Legislature to conclude that zoning
shall not await the development of a master plan. Accordingly, as of October
15, 1954, while there were 371 zoning ordinances in our State, there were
320 planning boards and but 112 master plans.
Id. at 165-66, 131 A.2d at 7. See also Hyland v. Mayor & Township Comm., 130
N.J. Super. 471, 327 A.2d 675 (App. Div. 1974), which found rezoning to be in
accordance with a comprehensive plan when the plan had been adopted 10 months
after the rezoning.
The planning lag, however, has been overcome to some extent by federal en-
couragement of comprehensive planning. See Housing Act of 1954 § 701, 40
U.S.C. § 461 (1970). In 1971 the states, metropolitan areas, regions, districts,
counties, municipalities and Indian reservations receiving grants under the section
701 program totalled 425. BUDGET OFFICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, CATALOGUE OF FEDERAL DOmESTIC ASSISTANCE § 14.203 (1972), cited in
D. HAGMAN, URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CASES AND MATERIALS 57 (1973).
See also Vestal, Planning for Urban Areas: The Fight for Coherency, 56 IowA
L. REv. 19, 36-38 (1970).
State legislation has also generated land use planning activity. In Oregon, for
example, only 38 cities had comprehensive plans by 1969, a year in which progres-
sive land use planning was enacted. By 1974, however, 154 out of the state's 238
cities and 23 of 36 counties had developed plans to comply with the law. OREoON
LOCAL GOV'T RELATIONS Div. REPORT (Jan. 1974) (copy on file with Edward J.
Sullivan). For a table indicating the accelerating rate of planning in California
in response to land use legislation in that state see Perry, The Local "General
Plan" in California, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1971).
[Vol. 9:33
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shelf.IC Perhaps the relegation of planning to the background re-
flected an over-all scepticism toward the unproven city planning
profession, which faced an uphill struggle against deeply imbedded
American resentment of centralized power.'7 In any event, Alfred
Bettmen's comment that the plan was "not intended to have any
legal effect on the property, 18 notwithstanding contrary language
in the footnotes to SPEA,'5 articulated the still dominant view that
the comprehensive plan against which zoning was to be tested was
something other than that produced in the planning process under
SPEA. Accordingly, the first cases to discuss the statutory require-
ments of zoning "in accordance with the comprehensive plan" looked
to the comprehensiveness of the zoning ordinance itself rather than
to an external standard embodied in a master plan.20 A legislative
16. Footnotes to SPEA heavily stressed the advisory nature of the plan. Func-
tional separation of planning from decision-making was thought to be necessary
to insulate the plan from the vagaries of politics. Accordingly, it was recom-
mended that the plan should not be approved by the city council but by the
planning commission alone. SPEA, supra note 13, at § 8 n.44.
On the other hand, SPEA did accord some weight to the plan. Section 9, for
example, required planning commission approval of certain public improvements
subject only to council veto by a two-thirds vote. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B,
§ 3.08 (1970). Other language in the footnotes to SPEA also seemed to contra-
dict the plan's limited role. See quotation in note 19 infra.
17. 1 A. Dr TOCQUEVILLE, DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA 71 (8th ed. H. Reeve
transl., P. Bradley ed. 1960). See also Key Realty Co. Zoning Case, 408 Pa. 98,
102, 106-08, 182 A.2d 187, 190, 192 (1962) (Bell, C.J., concurring), in which
constitutional property rights are defended against the standardless "hodge-podge"
of the comprehensive plan. An argument for decentralized (i.e. neighborhood)
control is advanced in M. KOTLER, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT (1969). For
excellent critiques of master planning in the 1940's and 1950's see E. BANFIELD
& 3. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 187-203 (1963); J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE
OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
18. A. BETTIAN, CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERS 42 (1946).
19. Section 2 of SPEA empowered municipalities to "make, adopt, amend,
extend, add to or carry out a municipal plan." SPEA, supra note 13, at § 2. An
accompanying footnote added: "The Act contemplates that the planning com-
mission shall not only make the plan but also have a strong influence in protect-
ing the plan against departures and in getting the plan carried out, and that, in
the case of subdivisions and street locations, it shall even have a considerable
degree of control." Id. at n.8.
20. Coley v. Campbell, 126 Misc. 869, 215 N.Y.S. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1926), and
City of Olean v. Conkling, 157 Misc. 63, 283 N.Y.S. 66 (Sup. Ct. 1935), con-
strued New York's zoning enabling act which predated SPEA but employed
similar language. See note 81 infra.
1975]
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presumption of validity further shielded most zoning decisions from
judicial scrutiny.21
Critics of planless zoning, however, attracted an expanding audience
as pressures for urban and suburban development revealed the in-
adequacies of the existing land use regulatory scheme. For example,
while the zoning system supposedly insulated local government from
the reach of special interests and limited the opportunity for ad hoc
decision-making, the door was in fact held ajar for these evils by
such devices as the zoning amendment, the variance, and the special
exception. 22 Such "accommodation" or "flexibility" mechanisms, and
the accompanying unguided discretion, undermined the certainty and
simplicity of neatly mapped land use districts designed to keep each
"pig in its own pen. 22
Less than a generation after SZEA inaugurated zoning "in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan," it became apparent that the public
welfare was in no way protected from the onslaught of development
by landowners with "comprehensive" plans of their own and access
21. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); 1 R.
ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.14 (1968).
For attacks on the denomination of zoning action as legislative in nature and
entitled to a presumption of validity see Roberts, The Demise of Property Law,
57 CORNELL L. RaV. 1 (1971); Note, The General Public Interest vs. The Pre-
sumption of Zoning Ordinance Validity: A Debatable Question, 50 J. URBAN L.
129 (1972); Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-
judicial Action, 33 OHo ST. L.J. 130, 138 (1972).
The presumption of validity has been rejected in favor of a quasi-judicial
designation in Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 580, 507 P.2d
23, 26 (1973) (discussed in text at note 88 infra); accord, West v. City of
Portage, 392 Mlich. 458, 459-61, 221 N.W.2d 303, 304-06 (1974). See also
Freilich, Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County: Is
Rezoning an Administrative or Legislative Function?, 6 URBAN LAW. vii (1974).
But see City of Phoenix v. Beall, 22 Ariz. App. 141 ................, 524 P.2d 1314,
1317 (1974) (preferring the legislative designation over the quasi-judicial ap-
proach but relying on a confused interpretation of Justice Douglas' opinion in
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
22. R. BABcOcK, supra note 1, at 6-11.
23. Id. at 6; Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A
Case Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962); Heyman, Innovative Land
Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 183 (1972);
Note, Zoning: Variance Administration in Alameda County, 50 CALIF. L. REV.
101 (1962). See also 801 Ave. C, Inc. v. City of Bayonne, 127 N.J. Super. 128,
316 A.2d 694 (App. Div. 1974) (overturning city practice of using variance as
system for site plan review and ad hoc approval of high-rise apartments to meet
housing needs).
[Vol. 9:33
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to city hall.24 The magic words of the enabling act were no match
for the invocation of "guaranteed private property rights" and the
accommodating posture of friends and business associates sitting on
planning commission and local governing bodies. 25
In his article "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan"2" which
had a substantial impact on land use thinking, Professor Haar ex-
plored the potential of the plan requirement for harnessing the
unruly regulatory process. After conceding that SZEA provided scant
authority for requiring a separate master plan as a precondition to
zoning,27 Haar reviewed the various judicial interpretations of the
statutory "plan." He ruefully concluded that the emphasis has been
wrongly placed upon "whether the zoning ordinance is a compre-
hensive plan, not whether it is in accordance with a comprehensive
plan."2 8 As a separate master plan was not deemed mandatory,
zoning decisions were judicially tested against a single constitutional
standard that was easily satisfied, given the presumption of validity
attaching to legislative acts.29 Haar argued, however, that the compre-
hensive plan requirement should be read to create a second standard,
one that would test individual zoning regulations against their "fidelity
24. The nightmare of modem "redevelopment" under corporate sponsorship is
comically depicted in "The Apple War," Swedish Words, Inc. & Svensk Filmin-
dustri (1971). In the film, plans to transform a beautiful meadow into a sprawling
"recreational community" (unsubtly called "Deutschneyland") are repelled by
the resourceful townsfolk without legal assistance. On the other hand, the night-
mare of "redevelopment" by planners is depicted in Huxtable, The Ludicrous Re-
location of Covent Garden Market, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1975, § 2D, at 24, col. 1.
The writer describes an "ambitious casebook of planning horrors ... recognized
as such, not by the planners, but by the people." Id. col. 3.
25. Freilich & Larson, supra note 1, at 390-98. The authors' review of cor-
ruption in New York's Suffolk County borders on the hilarious.
26. Haar, supra note 6.
27. Id. at 1157.
28. Id. at 1173. Haar's regard for the credibility of planning at that time was
not shared by others. Banfield and Wilson, describing post-war city planning,
wrote:
Whether for one reason or another, most cities prepared documents called
master plans. . . . Mfost of the planning was done in 1960 and 1961 by
personnel who had little or no experience of master planning, and many of
the plans, of course, were hastily contrived to satisfy the minimum require-
ments of the federal agencies. "Ninety day wonders," these plans were called
by some of the planners who made them.
E. BANFIELD & J. WILSON, supra note 17, at 192.
29. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
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to the specific criteria of the master plan."30 Only then can the proper
relationship between planning and zoning be operationalized. Further-
more, only in this way can decisions by front line local officials, who
face severe pressures from advocates of parcel "adjustments," be scruti-
nized against an ascertainable standard that reflects police power
considerations:
Such a requirement will mean that the municipal legislature
has an ever-present reminder of long-term goals which it has been
forced to articulate, and will give lesser play to the pressures by
individuals for special treatment which tend over a period of
years to turn the once uniformly regulated district into a patch-
work. Further, it will give the courts a standard for review more
sharply defined than the reasonable in vacuo test upon which
they now are forced so largely to rely.3'
Professor Haar's view of the statutory comprehensive plan as a type
of land use constitution 3 2 taking the form of a master plan on which
a variety of regulatory devices might be based was, and may still be,
a minority position, notwithstanding its irrefutable and significant
distinction between planning and zoning. Twenty years after the
appearance of his first article, a majority of American jurisdictions
have not accepted the idea that a separate planning process is implicit
in the concept of zoning in accord with a plan.3 3 Ironically, courts
frequently cite Professor Haar's work while upholding the unitary
view of the statutory requirement (i.e. that a zoning ordinance itself
can serve as the statutory "comprehensive plan"), although his
references to that theory were almost exclusively by way of attack. s 4
Indeed, it is probably fair to say that few articles have been more
widely quoted and, at the same time, more narrowly relied upon,
30. Haar, supra note 6, at 1156.
31. Id. at 1174. See generally D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 57-77
(1971).
32. Another characterization has been provided by Professor Ira M. Heyman,
who states that "the planning process provides both the ingredients for a 'Brandeis
brief' and the detailed arguments necessary to distinguish the treatment of what
might otherwise appear to be similarly situated property owners." Heyman, supra
note 23, at 234.
33. See, e.g., Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d
402 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 63
N.j. 335, 307 A.2d 563 (1973); Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214
Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974); Shelton v. Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 28, 39, 435
P.2d 949, 955 (1968).
34. Haar, supra note 6, at 1157-58.
[Vol. 9:33
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than has "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan."35 Yet, while the
unitary view continues to dominate current planning law, a discernible
trend exists toward the direction advocated by Haar. A review of
relevant case and statutory law since publication of Haar's paper,
as well as more recent land planning legislation, indicates that
planless zoning, long a roadblock to needed land use reform, will
soon be discredited.
Cases construing the relationship between land use regulation and
the comprehensive plan can be divided into three general categories.
The majority view, which developed from the backwards relationship
between planning and zoning in the Standard Enabling Acts, considers
zoning a self-contained activity.- Since a zoning scheme is equated
with the statutory comprehensive plan, we refer to this line of cases
as the unitary view.
A second line of cases reflects an increasing judicial predisposition
to grant legal status, if not controlling weight, to official or master
plans as distinct from zoning ordinances. Under this view, while a
master plan is not a sine qua non of valid zoning, land use decisions
are at least examined in light of the standards and policies set out
in a planning document, if one has been adopted.3 7 Because zoning
under this view implements an over-all, although optional, planning
process, these cases express a planning factor doctrine.
Finally, a growing minority of jurisdictions formally acknowledge
the conceptual invalidity of the unitary "zoning as planning" prin-
ciple. Under recently enacted legislative authority, courts in these
jurisdictions require consistency between local regulatory action and
a separately adopted, statutorily defined master or comprehensive
plan."" We shall refer to these cases, under which the comprehensive
plan has finally come of age, as expressive of a planning mandate
theory.
35. The cases typically refer to Haar's observation that courts have not read
zoning enabling acts to require a separate plan. See, e.g., Grubel v. MacClaughlin,
286 F. Supp. 24, 30 (V.I. 1968) ; Pressman v. City of Baltimore, 222 Md. 330,
338, 160 A.2d 379, 383 (1960); Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J.
154, 166, 131 A.2d 1, 7 (1957); Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Martin, 16 App. Div.
2d 1, 4, 225 N.Y.S.2d 112, 115 (1962). See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 372
(1971).
36. See, e.g., cases cited note 33 supra.
37. See note 61 infra.
38. See note 73 infra.
19751
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
A. The Unitaty View
The case most often cited as representing the conception of zoning
as a self-contained activity, reviewable only against a constitutional
standard, is Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township.39 In Kozesnik, two
New Jersey townships amended their zoning ordinances to permit rock
quarrying and processing operations in areas previously zoned for
agricultural and residential uses. Plaintiff-landowners challenged the
validity of these amendments alleging, inter alia, that the statutory
requirement of zoning "in accordance with a comprehensive plan"
had not been satisfied.40 Noting that no master plan had been adopted
by either township, plaintiffs argued that the zoning amendments
were void since "there can be no comprehensive plan unless it is
evidenced in writing dehors the zoning ordinance itself.""
While plaintiffs' "planning precedes zoning" theory concededly had
"good housekeeping"42 on its side, the court offered a three-part
rationale for rejecting plaintiffs' position and held that "[a] plan may
readily be revealed in an end-product-here the zoning ordinance-
and no more is required by the statute." 43 First, the court observed
that the state planning act, though authorizing the creation of a
planning commission and a master plan, was permissive rather than
obligatory.44 Secondly, the state's zoning act, while containing the
standard requirement of zoning in accordance with a comprehensive
plan, nowhere equated such a plan with the optional master plan of
the planning act. Adoption of the zoning act prior to the planning
act was deemed supportive of this point.45 Lastly, the inherent mean-
ing of the statutory phrase "comprehensive plan" did not imply to
the court the necessity of a separate document.4 The regulations in
question, therefore, met the statutory requirement because they were
in accordance with the adopted comprehensive ordinances of both
townships.
Since Kozesnik unfortunately represents the present majority posi-
tion regarding the comprehensive plan requirement, particularly when
39. 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957).
40. Id. at 164, 131 A.2d at 6.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 165, 131 A.2d at 7.
43. Id. at 166, 131 A.2d at 8.
44. Id. at 165, 131 A.2d at 6.
45. Id., 131 A.2d at 7; Haar, supra note 6, at 1154.
46. 24 N.J. at 165, 131 A.2d at 7-8.
[Vol. 9:33
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no master plan has been adopted by the locality, a few comments on
the court's approach are in order. After initially acknowledging that
planning and zoning were conceptually distinguished in another case,47
the court's analysis began with a brief inquiry into the purpose to
be served by the statutory requirement of zoning in accordance with
a comprehensive plan. That purpose, the court believed, was to
prevent "a capricious exercise of the legislative power resulting in
haphazard or piecemeal zoning."48 It remained only for the court to
define "comprehensive" as "something beyond a piecemeal approach ' 49
and "plan" as "an integrated product of a rational process"'5 0 in order
to conclude that the zoning scheme conformed to the assumed objec-
tive of the statutory requirement.
Perhaps, as Haar had commented two years earlier, the court's
approach did not "do extreme violence to the statutory language." 5'
Moreover, from a strictly short-term viewpoint, the Kozesnik rationale
permitted the necessary day-by-day decisions on land use to be made
with judicial approval, until a planning process, though belated, could
be undertaken. Nonetheless, the rationale is the narrowest and, from
an environmental and land use planning perspective, the most short-
sighted interpretation of the comprehensive plan requirement.
By assuming that a comprehensive zoning ordinance could serve as
the single referent for a police power analysis, the court accorded such
documents an undeserved rationality and integrity.52 A zoning ordi-
nance considered in some respects "comprehensive" should not be
confused with a total physical and social planning process that articu-
lates specific land use policies and goals and that is scrutinized by a
47. Id., 131 A.2d at 7. The court cited Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of
West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1938), in which zoning was
described as "the separation of the municipality into districts." Planning, on
the other hand, was "a term of broader significance" connoting a "systematic
development contrived to promote the common interest in matters that from the
earliest times have been considered as embraced within the police power." Id.
at 149, 198 A. at 228. Nonetheless, Kozesnik did not integrate these two func-
tions by viewing planning as a framework within which to regulate land use.
48. 24 N.J. at 165, 131 A.2d at 7.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Haar, supra note 6, at 1173.
52. Planning documents of the day may not have been much better. One
writer has described them as little more than "civic new year's resolutions." N.
LoNG, THE POLITY 192 (1962). See also E. BANIFIELD & J. WILSON, supra note
17; J. JAcOBS, supra note 17.
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cross section of public and private interests prior to adoption. Testing
the decision in Kozesnik-that quarrying and processing were suitable
uses of the land-in terms of its relationship to local zoning ordinances
adopted ten years earlier may have prevented a capricious exercise of
the legislative power, but it did little more.53 The absence of ca-
priciousness should not be the sole standard in making decisions that
permanently affect the use of land.54 In failing to interpret the
statutory plan as demanding the integration of zoning into an over-all
planning framework, the court virtually neutralized the potential
value of the comprehensive plan requirement as a means of forcing
local decision-makers to justify their actions in light of the community
welfare by taking into account projections for future over-all develop-
ment as well as immediate needs.
Notwithstanding that Kozesnik symbolizes the unitary view, the
decision may contain elements that imply a broader conception of
the functional value of the comprehensive plan requirement. The
court noted that one of the townships involved, subsequent to its
adoption of a general zoning ordinance in 1941, began to develop a
master plan. 55 Although never formally adopted, the plan apparently
served as the basis for updating the township's zoning ordinance.50
Among the plan's recommendations was the use of the area under
consideration in Kozesnik for quarrying operations.5 7 Conceivably
this recommendation, though not expressly relied upon by the court,
contributed to its decision to uphold the permissive zoning amend-
ments.6 8 If so, a connection may be established between Kozesnik and
a number of other comprehensive plan decisions that may be
53. Other courts have concluded that the "arbitrary and capricious" concept is
inadequate as a minimal standard for zoning review. In Fasano v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 581, 507 P.2d 23, 27 (1973), the court flatly
stated: "We reject the proposition that judicial review of the county commis-
sioners' determination to change the zoning of the particular property in question
is limited to a determination whether the change was arbitrary and capricious."
The county's adopted comprehensive plan was then invoked as the proper stand-
ard of review. Cf. text at note 52 supra.
54. Haar, supra note 6, at 1174.
55. 24 N.J. at 170, 131 A.2d at 14.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Bartlett v. Middletown Township, 51 N.J. Super. 239, 268-69, 143 A.2d
778, 794-95 (App. Div. 1958), in which the comprehensive plan was equated
with a zoning ordinance, itself a product of "extensive" study involving planners
and input from the community.
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considered transitional holdings, signaling a move from a strictly
unitary view to one in which the plan is accorded controlling weight
in evaluating local land use decisions.
B. The Planning Factor
Courts that acknowledge the importance of the planning factor
in land use decision-making do not attempt to alter the zoning/
planning hierarchy institutionalized in the standard acts. They do,
however, accord significance to the comprehensive plan requirement,
thereby disabusing the land market of the misconception that land
regulation can be pursued without reference to an over-all policy
framework and, at the same time, further community values. The
planning factor cases insist upon a demonstrable relationship between
zoning action and an articulated land use policy providing a "basic
scheme for land use." ' While the policy referent need not exist
outside the zoning ordinance and mapA0 an adopted separate master
plan provides a preferred standard of review.61
The case that best articulates the planning factor approach is Udell
v. Haas.,- At issue was a hastily adopted down-zoning of an area
historically zoned for commercial development to exclusively resi-
dential use. Convincing evidence was presented that the change was
directly aimed at frustrating plaintiff's intention to develop two
businesses on property assembled in reliance on the commercial desig-
nation.a The court denied the zone change, relying primarily on the
59. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 470, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d
888, 894 (1968).
60. In Udell the comprehensive plan was found in a statement of "develop-
mental policy" incorporated into the town's zoning ordinance and map. Id. at
473-74, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
61. Biske v. City of Troy, 381 Mich. 611, 621-23, 166 N.W.2d 453, 459-60(1969), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 6 Mich. App. 546, 149 N.W.2d 899 (1967)(adopted plan would be evidence of reasonableness of zoning action, but a plan
had not been adopted). In another Michigan case, Raabe v. City of Walker,
383 Mich. 165, 174 N.W.2d 789 (1970), the court enjoined rezoning that was
not related to a general plan. Once again, a separate plan had not been adopted.
The court dismissed the unitary theory, which states that the original zoning
ordinance could substitute for a master plan: "[Ihe defendant city ... has
never adopted a ... master plan for the physical development of the municipality
and its environs nor has it done so uithin the mentioned 'enabling statute,' save
only as may be uncertainly implied from the city's original zoning ordinance or
carried in the possibly variant memories of city officials." Id. at 176, 174 N.W.2d
at 795 (emphasis added).
62. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
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failure of local officials to meet the statutory requirement that zoning
be in accordance with a comprehensive plan.04
As in Kozesnik the court turned to Professor Haar's review of the
planning/zoning relationship."1 While Kozesnik minimized the plan-
ning function, the unmistakable emphasis in Udell was on the plan
as a constitutional document.0 6 Conceptual deficiencies of the unitary
theory were alluded to in the warning that "our courts must require
local zoning authorities to pay more than mock obeisance to the
statutory mandate that zoning be 'in accordance with a comprehensive
plan.' ,,r Later, the court noted that "the difficulties involved in
developing rational schemes of land use controls become insuperable
when zoning or changes in zoning are followed, rather than preceded,
by study and consideration." as
Striking down the "reactionary" rezoning, the Udell court noted that
the only reliable standard for zoning review-the land use policy-
had already been implemented by a zoning designation consistent
with appellant's objectives.6a The court's conception of zoning as a
tool for implementing a policy contained in the plan echoed argu-
ments advanced by Professor Haar over a decade earlier. In a passage
that nearly paraphrases Haar's language, the court concluded: "If
there is any justification for this interference with appellant's use of
his property, it must be found in the needs and goals of the com-
munity as articulated in a rational statement of land control policies
known as the 'comprehensive plan.'-7o
63. Id. at 473, 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
64. Id. at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
65. Id. at 469-70, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894. The opinion quotes
Haar's critique of those comprehensive plan interpretations that have failed to see
planning as an integral aspect of land use regulation. On the other hand, many
courts have cited Haar on narrower grounds, in effect ignoring his attack on plan-
less zoning. Cf. note 35 supra.
66. The notion of the plan as a policy-based framework was articulated many
years earlier in City of Utica v. Hanna, 202 App. Div. 610, 612, 195 N.Y.S. 225,
227 (1922). New York courts, however, never equated the statutory compre-
hensive or well-considered plan with a separate master plan. Cutler, Legality of
Zoning to Exclude the Poor: A Preliminary Analysis of Evolving Law, 37
BROOKLYN L. REv. 483, 486 (1971); Note, Comprehensive Plan Requirement in
Zoning, 12 SYRAcusE L. Rnv. 342, 346-47 (1961).
67. 21 N.Y.2d at 470, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
68. Id. at 471, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
69. Id. at 472-73, 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
70. Id. at 476, 235 N.B.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
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Other courts have similarly given weight to the planning factor in
their approach to land use decisions.71 The thought in Udell was that
rezoning in disregard of a planning process was unsupportable. Other
courts, however, have held that the absence of a formally adopted
master plan severely weakens the presumption of validity accorded
zoning decisions.7 2 Both approaches attempt to read planning mean-
ingfully into the statutory comprehensive plan requirement. Standing
alone, these cases appear to be only a minor attack on the entrenched
unitary theory. They can also be viewed, however, as immediate
forerunners of statutory reform in states that have recently required
conformance between formally adopted land use plans and regulatory
action. 73 In addition, the planning factor cases provide well-reasoned
authority for those seeking to bring the law into line with contempo-
rary environmental and land use considerations.7 4
71. O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 780-83, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283,
286-88 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (decided prior to California's requirement of con-
sistency between zoning and a "general plan" in CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65850-60
(Deering 1973) ); City of Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973)
(refusal to rezone to multi-family use was held arbitrary on the basis of the plan);
Aspen Hill Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 265 Md. 303, 289 A.2d 303
(1972) (denial of rezoning petition was held arbitrary on the basis of the master
plan). See also F. H. Uelner Precision Tools & Dies, Inc. v. City of Dubuque,
190 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1971) (when an inconsistency between zoning and
designation in the master plan exists, the plan does not control if consistency
would cause hardship to existing business); Doran Invs. v. Muhlenberg Township
Bd. of Comm'rs, 10 Pa. Commw. 143, 309 A.2d 450 (1973) (if statutory re-
quirements set forth in planned unit development ordinance are met, Township
cannot refuse developer's application for permit even if approval is contrary to
c.,mprehensive plan).
The plan has also been relied on in the "planning factor" cases to strike down
allegedly arbitrary rezoning. See Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 413, 235 N.E.2d 897,
288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
72. Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 I1. App. 3d 230,
242-43, 309 N.E.2d 763, 772-73 (1974); Raabe v. City of Walker, 383 Mich. 165,
178-79, 174 N.W.2d 789, 796 (1970).
73. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65850-60 (Deering 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §
10703 (1974). The American Law Institute's Model Development Code does
not require a plan but provides incentives for plan adoption. MODEL LAND DEv.
CODE (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1974). But cf. Doran Invs. v. Muhlenberg
Township Ed. of Comm'rs, 10 Pa. Commw. 143, 309 A.2d 450 (1973).
74. In Baker v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Ore. App. 389 . ........ 520 P.2d 479, 482
(1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part . ............... Ore ................. , 533 P.2d 772
(1975), the Oregon Court of Appeals rejected the contention that zoning in
accordance with a well-considered plan required that city zoning conform to
an adopted master plan. On appeal to the Oregon supreme court, heavy reliance
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
C. The Planning Mandate
A slowly developing judicial posture favoring planning has merged
with legislative action in numerous states especially sensitive to the
inadequacies of unguided land regulation.7 5 In terms of the compre-
hensive plan requirement it is important to consider the trend toward
a judicial mandate that localities plan and adopt regulatory measures
within the planning framework. The remarkable concurrence between
Oregon's legislative and judicial branches promoting a strong planning
requirement makes that state an appropriate point of departure for
a discussion of the planning mandate doctrine.
Unlike most states that adopted SZEA,70 with its now-famous re-
quirement that zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive
plan,"7 7 and states that enacted SPEA,78 employing the term "master
plan,"79 Oregon typically avoided well-trodden paths. Oregon's city
zoning enabling legislation was passed in 1919,80 before the standard
acts were drafted, and merely required that city zoning enabling legis-
lation be "in accordance with a well-considered plan."8 In 1947
Oregon counties were given the authority to zone if they had a
"development pattern" by which their actions could be judged.82 In
was placed on the "planning factor" cases. Brief for Oregon Environmental
Council & Oregon Chapter of American Institute of Planners as Amicus Curiae
at 18-22, Baker v. City of Milwaukee, ................ Ore ................. , 533 P.2d 772
(1975). See also notes 81-84 and 102-105 and accompanying text in/ra.
75. For a discussion of noteworthy examples of recent statutory reform in this
area see Part II infra.
76. SZEA, supra note 12.
77. Id. § 3.
78. SPEA, supra note 13.
79. Id. § 6.
80. Law of March 4, 1919, ch. 300, [1919] Ore. Laws 539 (now ORE. REv.
STATS. §§ 227.010-.310 (1973) ).
81. ORE. Rav. STATS. § 227.240(1) (1973). This language was apparently
derived from the 1917 version of New York's city zoning enabling statute. Law of
May 15, 1917, ch. 483, [1917] 2 N.Y. 1463 (now N.Y. TowN LAW § 263
(McKinney 1965) ).
It has been suggested that no distinction exists between the statutory "well-
considered" plan and the "comprehensive" plan. Note, Comprehensive Plan Re-
quirement in Zoning, supra note 66, at 346. A literal reading would imply that
the former at least contemplates a planning process on which to base regulatory
action. In Baker v. City of Milwaukee . ............... Ore ................. , 533 P.2d 772
(1975), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 17 Ore. App. 384, 520 P.2d 489 (1974), the
Oregon Supreme Court adopted the planning mandate theory for those Oregon
cities that had adopted plans.
82. Law of April 19, 1947, ch. 537, [1947] Ore. Laws 948 (now Oa. REv.
STATS. §§ 215.010-.999 (1973) ).
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1963 the "development pattern" phrase was replaced by the "compre-
hensive plan" requirement and mandatory adoption of the plan by
the planning commission was imposed S3
In spite of such legislation, little discussion is found in early Oregon
appellate decisions of the terms "comprehensive" or "well-considered"
plan.6 Even after 1969, when reform legislation was enacted,85 Oregon
courts continued to place scant reliance on the plan as a standard
for reviewing land use regulatory decisions.8 6 The break came in the
landmark case of Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners,7 decided
by Oregon's supreme court in 1973.
Fasano must be viewed against the backdrop of S.B. 10,88 passed by
the Oregon Legislature in 1969. The bill gave localities two years in
which to adopt comprehensive land use plans and zoning ordinances.89
The Governor was authorized to "prescribe, amend . . . and ad-
minister"0'° the plan and ordinance in any locality failing to meet
the 1971 deadline. Although the grant of executive power to plan
and impose land use regulations was opposed by steadfast home rule
advocates , among others, S.B. 10 emerged as a clear expression of
legislative policy requiring both planning and land use regulation.
The crucial task of further defining the planning/regulation rela-
tionship fell to the Oregon supreme court when review was granted
in Fasano. The county commissioners had approved an application
83. Law of June 24, 1963, ch. 619 § 3, [1963] Ore. Laws 1297.
84. See, e.g., Page v. City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280 (1946);
Berger v. City of Salem, 131 Ore. 674, 284 P. 273 (1930); Kroner v. City of
Portland, 116 Ore. 141, 240 P. 536 (1925).
85. Law of June 3, 1969, ch. 324, [1969] Ore. Laws 578 (now ORE. REV.
STATS. §§ 215.505-.990 (1973) ). The bill is commonly known as S.B. 10.
86. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 366-67. See also MANDELKER, supra note 31, at
72-75.
87. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
88. Law of June 3, 1969, ch. 324, [1969] Ore. Laws 578 (now ORE. REV.
STATS. §§ 215.505-.990 (1973)).
89. Id. § 1.
90. Id.
91. Indeed, one staunch anti-planner remarked to a legislative committee con-
sidering the bill: "In the previous hearing on SB 10, testimony was given that if
yoa scratch a farmer long enough you will find a subdivider. I say that if you
scratch a professional planner long enough, you will find either a bureaucratic
sociologist, an American Socialist, or an American Communist. I have yet to
meet a practical minded planner." Testimony of Paul C. Ramsey, Hearings on
SB 10 Before the House Planning & Dev. Comm., Apr. 8, 1969 (on file at the
State Archives, Salem, Oregon).
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to rezone part of a single family area to permit the development of
a mobile home park under a planned unit development designation. 2
The court rejected this action citing, as the standard for zoning re-
view, projections of the adopted comprehensive plan. 3 In language
that has profoundly affected land use law in Oregon, and perhaps
in other states,94 the court said:
We believe that the state legislature has conditioned the county's
power to zone upon the prerequisite that the zoning attempt to
further the general welfare of the community through conscious-
ness, in a prospective sense, of the factors mentioned above.05 In
other words, except as noted later in this opinion, it must be
proved that the change is in conformance with the comprehensive
plan.96
Furthermore, the Oregon court correctly distinguished the planning
and zoning functions:
Although we are aware of the analytical distinction between
zoning and planning, it is clear that under our statutes the plan
adopted by the planning commission and the zoning ordinances
enacted by the county governing body are closely related; both
are intended to be parts of a single integrated procedure for land
use control. The plan embodies policy determinations and guiding
principles; the zoning ordinances provide the detailed means of
giving effect to those principles. 97
The court, therefore, rejected the unitary view of planning and zoning
and imposed a duty upon local officials to premise land regulations
on policies set out in the separately prepared and adopted compre-
hensive plan.
At the time Fasano was decided, the Oregon Legislature was con-
sidering S.B. 100, which it subsequently passed, to strengthen the role
of planning in the land use regulatory process.08 S.B. 100 required
that zoning, subdivision ordinances, and all state and local govern-
ment actions be in compliance with city and county comprehensive
92. 264 Ore. at 577, 507 P.2d at 25.
93. Id. at 583, 507 P.2d at 28.
94. See, e.g., West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 469, 221 N.W.2d 303,
308 (1974) ; Freilich, supra note 21, at vii.
95. Note that the court refers here to the considerations entering into formula-
tion of a comprehensive plan.
96. 264 Ore. at 583, 507 P.2d at 28.
97. Id. at 582, 507 P.2d at 27.
98. ORE. Rav. STAT. §§ 197.005-.430 (1973).
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plans." A state agency with the power to adopt or amend local plans
was authorized to review such plans.100 The Act further provided a
means to review implementation ordinances, as well as actions taken
at all levels of government, for consistency with approved local plans.10'
The most recent part of this re-evaluation of the relationship be-
tween planning and zoning in Oregon came with Baker v. City of
Milwaukee.10 2 In Baker, plaintiff brought a mandamus action to
compel the city and its officials to conform city zoning regulations
to a subsequently adopted comprehensive plan. The City successfully
argued at the lower court levels that there was no statutory require-
ment that zoning be in accordance with a plan and that the plan,
adopted by resolution, could not supersede zoning regulations adopted
by ordinance.
In reversing, the Oregon supreme court stated that since the City
had adopted a plan, it was required to zone so that the plan was not
frustrated. 1' 0  The court relied on Udell and commentary by Pro-
fessor Haar as authority. Furthermore, the court found that a plan,
as a "constitutional" document for land use planning, was superior
to zoning regulations, due to the inherent relationship of the two
functions, whether the plan was adopted by resolution or by ordi-
nance.' 04 Finally, the court noted that the obvious conflict between
the plan and the zoning maps conflicted with the statutory require-
ment that regulations be "in accord with a well-considered plan."' 05
Thus the Oregon approach to interpreting enabling legislation
gives meaning to the ambiguous term "well-considered" or "compre-
hensive" plan. The comprehensive plan has been properly recognized
as a process of forethought rather than a fait accompli or "end
99. Id. § 197.175-.185.
100. Id. §§ 197.300, 197.325.
101. Id.
102 ................. Ore ............ 533 P.2d 772 (1975), aff'g in part, rev'g in part
17 Ore. App. 389, 520 P.2d 479 (1974).
In response to Baker the 1975 Oregon legislature attempted to grant the LODC
the power, upon application, to resolve conflicts between the comprehensive plan
and rezoning ordinances. The bill failed to pass both houses. See S.B. 122, 58th
Leg. Assembly (Ore. 1975).
103. This requirement meant that no area could be zoned for a use more in-
tensive than that provided for by the plan, though less intensive uses were
permissible.
104. The court made extensive use of O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 774,
42 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), which reached the same functional re-
sult. O'Loane held that a plan, although adopted by resolution, could be sub-
mitted to referendum, because of its land use policy implications.
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product," as under the unitary theory. The approach was initiated
by the legislature and given full meaning in the courts. To a large
extent, then, Oregon has passed from "planning equals zoning" to a
separate planning or "planning mandate" approach. 100
Notwithstanding advances made in the area of planning require-
ments, the proper relationship between the plan and regulatory
measures remains unsettled. For example, Fasano's discussion of
standards for measuring conformity to the plan will surely require
additional explication. 1°7
105. ORE. Rav. STAT. § 227.240(1) (1973).
106. Several other states have reached a similar result through the legislative
process. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65850-62 (Deering 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 10703 (1974). See also Plager, The Planning Land-Use Control Relation-
ship: A Look at Some Alternatives, 3 LAND USE CONTROLS Q., No. 1, at 26 (1969).
107. The court held, inter alia, that proof of conformity would require, in addi-
tion to consistency with the projections of the plan, a showing of "a public need
for a change of the kind in question" and, further, that the "need would be best
served by changing the classification of the particular piece of property in ques-
tion as compared with other available property." 264 Ore. at 584, 507 P.2d at
28. One might argue that the criteria of "need" and "other available property"
function as time-sequence control techniques, imparting a timing element to the
plan.
In an extended footnote, the court illustrated the operation of these criteria.
On the issue of need for the change in question, the court noted that a record
disclosing "that the governing body had considered the facts relevant to this
question and exercised its judgment in good faith" would satisfy the test. Id.
at 586-87 n.3, 507 P.2d at 29 n.3.
It is established that absolute identity is not required between the plan's pro-
jections and the zoning designation of a given parcel. Bissell v. Washington
County, 12 Ore. App. 174, 506 P.2d 499 (1973) (denial of rezoning to conform
to plan's designations upheld on grounds that circumstances were not yet ap-
propriate). See also Baker v. City of Milwaukee ................ Ore ................., 533
P.2d 772 (1975), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 17 Ore. App. 389, 520 P.2d 479
(1974).
A similar problem confronts the California courts in interpreting that state's
requirement of "consistency" between the plan and land use measures. See
Comment, "Zoning Shall be Consistent with the General Plan"- A Help or a
Hindrance to Planning?, 10 SAN DIEGo L. Rzv. 901 (1973). In an attempt to
clarify California's "consistency" requirement, the legislature amended the statute
to read: "A zoning ordinance shall be consistent with a city or county general
plan only if: ... (ii) The various land uses authorized by the ordinance are
compatible with the objectives, policies, general land uses and programs specified
in such a plan." Act of August 9, 1972, ch. 639, § 2, [1972] 1 Cal. Laws 1190-91
(now CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860(a) (Deering 1974) (emphasis added) ).
Whether the compatibility standard sheds much light on the "consistency" re-
quirement under the California statute remains to be seen. An opinion by Cali-
fornia's Legislative Counsel interpreted the consistency requirement as follows:
Whether or not a particular zoning ordinance and general plan are in agree-
ment or in harmony would of course depend on their specific terms. How-
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II. LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN PLANNING
Several state legislatures have been more decisive regarding the
role of the plan vis t vis land use regulations than have the courts.
The following review of recent state planning enabling legislation,
while not all-indusive, demonstrates the trend toward increased state
participation in the planning process and a greater emphasis on
planning than is found in the standard acts.108
A. Hawaii
In 1963 Hawaii withdrew from its county governments (Hawaii
does not have city government) the delegated power to plan and
zone, creating instead a Land Use Commission with power to divide
the state into major land use categories.109 The legislation was a
major step away from the typical arrangement in other states at that
time, i.e. full delegation of such powers to local government.
In effect the establishment of four major land use categories by
the Commission involves a planning process. 10 Once categories are
established, the State Department of Land and Natural Resources
governs zoning in natural resource areas. Within rural and agricul-
tural districts, the Commission sets land use standards and the
ever, a zoning ordinance which permits either a greater or less intense land
use than that permitted by the general plan would not be in agreement
with or harmonious with the general plan and, in our opinion, would not be
consistent with the general plan.
Letter from George H. Murphy, California Legislative Counsel, to the Hon. John
T. Knox, Feb. 2, 1972, in AB 1301 and Local Land Use Decisions, Report by
County Counsel to County of San Diego Board of Supervisors, app. B (Sept.
1972) (copy on file with Edward J. Sullivan).
108. For a comprehensive survey of legislation in this area see ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICy DIV., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 93d
CONG., IST SESS., NATIONAL LAND USE POLICY LEGISLATION, 93d CONGRESS
(Comm. Print 1973) (Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs).
109. Act of June 17, 1963, ch. 205, [1963] Hawaii Laws 315, as amended,
Act of May 5, 1965, ch. 32, [1965] Hawaii Laws 27, as amended, Act of July 11,
1969, ch. 182, [1969] Hawaii Laws 328 (now HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 205-1, -3,
-7 to -15 (1968), §§ 205-2, -4 to -6 (Supp. 1974) ). The Commission also has
the power to revise these boundaries in narrowly circumscribed situations. See
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-4 (Supp. 1974). For a case stressing the procedural
difficulties inherent in such a change see Town v. Land Use Comm'n .............
lawaii ................ , 524 P.2d 84 (1974).
110. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 205-2 (Supp. 1974) specifically provides: "In
establishing the boundaries of the districts in each county, the commission shall
give consideration to the master plan or general plan of the county."
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county administers them."' With Commission approval, however,
the county may allow other uses compatible with the district. The
counties still retain zoning control over the urban areas.11 2 Thus
planning and land use regulation in Hawaii are functions under-
taken by both state and local government.
B. Vermont
In 1969 Vermont also entered the land use field from a state-wide
perspective, passing legislation that, as amended, provides for a state-
wide plan and control over major development proposals.113 A State
Environmental Board1 4 and nine regional District Commissions ad-
minister a system of development permits,12 prepare both Capability
and Development-6 and land use plans"17 for legislative adoption,
and change the boundaries of the land use plan or capability plan
classification."18
Thus the Vermont system provides for state planning without
pre-empting local government and utilizes a permit system giving
both state and local governments a veto power over undesirable
development.
111. Id. §§ 205-5 to -6.
112. Id. § 205-5.
113. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-91 (1973), as amended, §§ 6001, 6001a,
6025-27, 6043, 6046, 6085-86, 6089 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The planning process
requires adoption of a Capability and Development Plan setting forth specific
state policies, adopted by the legislature, to encourage growth in Vermont, id. §
6042 (1973), and a land use plan, adopted by the State Environmental Board,
based on policies in the Capability and Development Plan, id. § 6043 (Cune.
Supp. 1974). The land use plan is then approved by the governor and the legisla-
ture. Id. § 6046.
114. Id. § 6021 (1973).
115. Id. § 6026 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The term "development" is a broad one,
defined in section 6001(3) to include all major construction activities within the
state. The permit system is administered under Sections 6081-91.
116. See note 113 supra.
117. The land use plan, upon adoption by the Board, will become the land use
criteria for any project having supra-local impact. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 6043
(Gum Supp. 1974).
118. Id. § 6047 (1973). As in Hawaii, there are stringent criteria for such
changes focusing on the suitability of the land for the purpose sought, trends of
development, and changes in conditions since adoption of the plan. The Vermont
courts are aware of the requirements of procedural due process in such cases.
See In re Preseault, 130 Vt. 343, 346-47, 292 A.2d 832, 834-35 (1972).
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C. Maine
Maine passed its Site Location Law in 1970.119 The law gives the
state Board of Environmental Protection the power to approve or
deny 2 0 development that may substantially affect the environment. 12'
Compared with legislation elsewhere, the Maine model is less planning-
oriented. Rather, the Act emphasizes the strict criteria of the permit-
granting process. 22
The State Planning Office, Planning Council, and Planning Director
are responsible for preparing and administering the Maine Compre-
hensive Plan and coordinating activities of the state with respect
to physical development.123 From a state agency perspective, there-
fore, Maine has a strict system of site approvals for individual public
or private projects and a planning process that is the measure for
physical development undertaken or approved by state agencies. 2 4
D. Florida
The Florida Legislature made sweeping changes in that state's
system of land use regulation by the enactment of the Environmental
119. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-88 (Supp. 1973). For a discussion
of the Maine legislation and a comparison to that of Vermont see Walter, The
Law of the Land: Development Legislation in Maine and Vermont, 23 MAINE
L. Rv. 315 (1971).
120. The Board was formerly the Environmental Improvement Commission.
Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 341 (Supp. 1973). Note, however, that the
Maine Legislature has delegated to the Maine Land Use Regulation Commission
the authority to adopt land use regulations for the "unorganized and deorganized
areas of the State," to provide for review of development, and to adopt a com-
prehensive plan for such areas by January 1, 1975. Id. tit 12, §§ 681-89 (1974).
121. As in Vermont the definition of development affecting the environment is
quite broad, including any development utilizing 20 acres of land or more and
involving dwelling or excavation. Also included are governmental, charitable,
industrial and commercial development. Id. tit. 38, § 482 (Supp. 1973).
122. Such criteria include consideration of soil types, traffic movement, and
financial capability. The burden is on the applicant to meet each criterion. Id.
§ 484.
123. Id. tit. 5, §§ 3301-07 (Supp. 1973), as amended, §§ 3304-05 (Supp.
1974). See also Delogu, Suggested Revisions in Maine's Planning and Land Use
Control Enabling Legislation, 20 MAINE L. REv. 175 (1968).
124. The dramatic changes made by the Site Location Law have so far with-
stood constitutional and statutory attacks. In re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310
A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973);
King Resources Co. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n, 270 A.2d 863
(Me. 1970). See also Wilkes, Constitutional Dilemmas Posed by State Policies
Against Marine Pollution-The Maine Example, 23 MAINE L. Rav. 143 (1971).
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Land and Water Management Act of 1972,12; which emphasizes a
permit process over a planning process. After procedures for notice
and comments are met, a state-wide Administrative Commissionl2a
may designate "an area of critical state concern." 127 Thereafter, local
government regulations affecting such areas must comply with state
rules. In addition, the Administrative Commission is required to
develop standards for "Developments of Regional Impact."1 28
The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission was es-
tablished to resolve conflicts regarding the use of land in areas of
critical state concern or relating to developments of regional impact.
The Commission may deny an application or approve it, with or
without additional conditions.129 Decisions of the Commission are
subject to judicial review under the Florida Administrative Pro-
cedures Act.130
Thus Florida emphasizes a development permit process that is
designed to provide for state review of local actions affecting more
than one entity. The approach is a modified system of the American
Law Institute's Model Land Development Code,131 which also does
not require a plan as a condition precedent for land use regulation.32
125. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012-.10 (Supp. 1974). As in Vermont and
Maine, the broad nature of development covered by the legislation indicates a
legislative change towards greater state participation in the land use process. Id.§ 380.04. See also Jacobsen, Survey of Environmental Legislation, 26 U. MIa~tu
L. REV. 778 (1972).
126. The Governor and his cabinet constitute the Administrative Commission.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.031(1) (Supp. 1974).
127. Such designation includes areas having sufficient impact upon "environ-
mntal, historical, natural or archeological resources," a proposed major facility
or other area of major public investment, or an area of major development poten-
tial (including new communities). Id. § 380.05(2). The legislature itself desig-
nated the Big Cypress Area as one of critical state concern by the Big Cypress
Conservation Act of 1973. Id. § 380.055.
128. Id. § 380.06. The administrative commission must submit all criteria for
development with regional impact to the legislature for approval by both houses.
Under this section, a local government must consider, when passing upon such
applications, whether the development, (1) complies with an adopted state land
use plan for the area; (2) is consistent with local land use regulations; and (3)
is consistent with the report of the applicable regional planning agency.
129. Id. § 380.07.
130. Id. § 120.68 (Supp. 1974).
131. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1974).
132. Id. §§ 2-210, 2-211. These sections require the adoption of a land de-
velopment plan only in connection with planned unit developments and specially
planned areas. Otherwise a plan is not required for the exeicise of land use
regulation.
[Vol. 9:33
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/3
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REQUIREMENT
E. California
California voters approved an initiative known as the California
Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972.133 The Act establishes one
state-wide commission and six regional commissions to pass upon
permits for development within a permit area. 34 The State Com-
mission also has the power to prepare a coastal zone plan'35 to be
submitted to the legislature by December 31, 1975.
It is the permit system, not the plan, that has generated the
greatest controversy 36 While construction in progress is not affected,
any development proposed after the effective date of the Act must
receive regional commission approval'3 7 following specific findings of
fact.', Appeals may be taken to the State Commission 39 and to the
courts.'"0
The California scheme emphasizes both a permit system and a
planning process for the protection of coastal areas and requires that
the planning process be performed by a state agency.
133. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-650 (Deering Supp. 1975).
134. The definition of development is broad and almost all-inclusive. Id. §
27103. Generally, development within 1000 feet of non-tidal areas and 1000 yards
of tidal areas is subject to the act. Id. § 27104.
135. Id. § 27001(b). The "coastal zone" is the shoreline area of the state from
the outer limits of the state's territorial jurisdiction to the highest elevation of the
nearest coastal range (or in Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego Counties, the
shorter distance between such elevation or five miles from the mean high tide
level). See id. § 27100.
136. Id. § 27104. Under the system, developments planned for a defined
"permit area" along the coast require approval from a regional zone conservation
commission. But see San Diego Coast Regulatory Comm'n v. See the Sea, Ltd.,
9 Cal. 3d 888, 513 P.2d 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973) (once development was
underway a non-conforming use status was granted).
137. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27400 (Deering Supp. 1974). Approval requires
a majority of the entire commission, but certain activities (e.g., dredging and
filling) require a two-thirds vote of the entire commission. Id. § 27401.
138. The burden is on the applicant to show conformity with the Act's criteria.
The commission must also make findings as to such conformity. Id. § 27402.
Under certain circumstances, conditions may be imposed upon the development
to reduce the activity's negative effects on the environment. Id. § 27403.
139. Id. § 27423.
140. Id. § 27424. Private actions are encouraged by the Act since anyone may
bring an action for equitable and declaratory relief without bond, maintain an
action for civil penalties, and recover costs and attorney fees. Id. §§ 27425-26,
27428.
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F. Oregon
Oregon has also provided for increased state participation in
planning.141 A new agency, the Land Conservation and Development
Commission (LCDC), was established by S.B. 100142 and given the
power to adopt state-wide planning goals to which all local plans
must conform.143 LCDC also has the power to designate activities of
critical state concern. 44
S.B. 10, passed in 1969,145 preceded S.B. 100146 and required each
city and county to plan and zone, or make substantial progress in
that direction, on penalty of having the Governor do so. 147 S.B. 100,
however, provides an over-all state policy for local planning and a
means by which local plans can be reviewed by the Commission for
conformity to the goals. 48 More significantly, local zoning and sub-
division ordinances, 149 and state and local actions and plans1 0 may
be reviewed for conformity with state goals.
141. See MacPherson & Paulus, Senate Bill 100: The Oregon Land Conserva-
tion and Development Act, 10 WILLAMETTE LJ. 414 (1974). See also Schell,
Summary of Land Use Regulation in the State of Oregon, in SENATE COMM. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 93d CONo., 2d SEss., STATE LAND USE PaO-
GRAMS, SUMMARIES OF LAND USE REGULATION IN EIGHT STATES 55 (Comm.
Print 1974) (includes a 50-state survey of planning legislation).
142. ORE. REV. STAT. § 197.030 (1973).
143. Id. § 197.040(2) (a).
144. Id. §§ 197.400-.430. The Act sets forth three activities for which the
Land Conservation and Development Commission could require a permit, in
addition to all other permits required by law: transportation systems; water and
sewer lines, and solid waste disposal sites; and the planning and siting of public
schools. Id. § 197.400.
145. Law of June 3, 1969, ch. 324, [1969] Ore. Laws 580 (now OR . Rvv.
STAT. §§ 215.505-.990 (1973) ). See text at notes 89-91 supra.
146. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 197.005-.430 (1973). See text at notes 98-101 supra.
147. Law of June 3, 1969, ch. 324, [1969] Ore. Laws 578 (now ORE. Rv.
STAT. ch. 215 (1973) ). When S.B. 100 was passed in 1973, however, the Gover-
nor's authority, passed to the Land Conservation and Development Commission.
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 215.505-.535 (1973). The cost of planning done by the
Commission is to be deducted from the local share of liquor and cigarette moneys.
Id. § 197.330.
148. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 197.005(2), .325.
149. Id. §§ 197.300(1) (a),(d). In these instances standing is conferred
upon state agencies, cities, counties, special districts, and "any person or group of
persons whose interests are substantially affected. . . ." Id. § 197.300(1) (d).
150. Id. §§ 197.300(1)(b),(c). In contrast to provisions in comprehensive
plans and ordinances or regulations, standing in cases of governmental actions is
conferred only upon other governmental agencies.
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The Oregon system, then, requires a plan by each local government
upon which all actions (state and local) shall be based, and provides
a means for coordinating such plans and adjudicating differences.
Thus the planning and implementing regulations and governmental
actions are coordinated under a uniform program.
G. Massachusetts
In 1969 Massachusetts passed a "Snob Zoning" law, prohibiting
local communities from interfering with the development of their
just share of low- and moderate-income housing.5 1 The state legis-
lature provided specific guidelines to be used by the Board of Zoning
Appeals in determining whether an application to build low- and
moderate-income housing is "consistent with local needs."'' The
guidelines,' :3 in effect, prevent applications by certain defined organi-
zations', for such housing from being denied on the basis of local
zoning ordinances and restrictions. Massachusetts, then, is less con-
cerned with planning per se than with the specialized problem of
housing supply for lower income groups. The housing problem is
one of state-wide significance.,1
151. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1973).
152. Id. § 20.
153. Utilization of the guidelines is a complex process. The granting or denial
of an application must be "consistent with local needs," and is irrebutable before
the Board of Zoning Appeals if low- and moderate-income housing at the time of
the application comprises 10% of the total housing units reported in the latest
census for that district, or if such housing already exists on sites greater in number
than a figure derived from two formulas provided in the statute. Id.
Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm.. ................ Mass -.............., 294
N.E.2d 393 (1973), upheld this statutory scheme, acknowledging that, in the
interests of the state as a whole, the legislature had withdrawn certain aspects of
the zoning power. Id. at ................, 294 N.E.2d at 407-10. From the statute's
legislative history, the court concluded that in order for the statute to accomplish
its goal of streamlining procedures for facilitating the approval and eventual
construction of low- and moderate-income housing, the Board must possess the
power to override local zoning ordinances and by-laws that are not "consistent
-ith local needs." Id. at ................, 294 N.E.2d at 407. The court did not view
the statute as an absolute requirement upon the community if its 10% minimum
is not yet met. The Board need not automatically grant permits. Rather, the
statute, as interpreted, merely prevents the Board from relying on local require-
ments and regulations that prevent the use of the requested site as grounds for
denial of a permit. Id. at ............... , 294 N.E.2d at 413.
154. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40B, § 21 (1973).
155. Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm.. ................ Mass .............
-......... 294 N.E.2d 393, 407-10 (1973). See also Note, The Massachusetts
Zoning Appeals Law: First Breach in the Exclusionary Wall, 54 B.U.L. REv. 37
(1974).
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H. New York
Concerned with the future of the Adirondacks region, most of
which is publicly owned, the State of New York passed the Adiron-
dack Park Agency Act in 1971.15'6 The Agency proposed and the
legislature passed a regional plan 57 that included shoreline restric-
tions to be enforced by the Agency.158 Because of the importance of
this vast area of public land to the State, the Agency was given the
power to review local land use programs959 and certain major projects
of supra-local concern.' 60
The New York legislation combines planning with a system of per-
mit review to provide for the fulfillment of legislative goals for the
Adirondacks.
I. Shoreland and Wetland Protection Acts
Several states have passed legislation specifically designed to protect
coastal wetlands or shorelines. This legislation, however, is not based
upon a state-wide planning or permit-granting procedure.
In Massachusetts the Commission of Conservation controls the
dredging, filling, alteration or pollution of coastal'O' and inland
wetlands.1 62 In flood plain or seacoast areas, notice to several state
and local agencies is required prior to dredging or filling. 03 Thus
less emphasis is placed on planning than on the regulation of activities.
Michigan has a vigorous program for shoreland and wetlands
protection. Under the Shorelands Protection and Management Act
of 1970,164 the State Water Resources Commission and State Depart-
156. Art. 27, §§ 800-19, ch. 706, [1971] 2 N.Y. Laws 1853.
157. d. § 805.
158. Id. § 806.
159. Id. § 807.
160. Id. § 808.
161. MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 130, § 105 (1972).
162. Id. ch. 131, § 40A (Supp. 1974). In the case of either coastal or inland
wetlands, an aggrieved party may petition the superior court within 90 days after
notice from the Commission to determine whether the Commission's order should
be rendered inoperative because it results in a taking. If a taking is found the
state may acquire, by eminent domain proceedings, a fee or lesser interest. This
method of review is exclusive on this issue. But see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES
J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40A (Supp. 1974); Note, Coastal
Wetlands in New England, 52 B.U.L. REv. 724 (1972).
164. MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.1831-.1845 (1973).
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ment of Natural Resources are required to undertake engineering
studies to determine areas in need of regulatory protection. If the
risk of adverse environmental impact is high, the township, city,
village or county is given three years to adopt land use regulations,
subject to Commission approval. Should the local governing body
fail to adopt such regulations the Commission is directed to prepare
and hold hearings upon a plan for such areas and to submit the plan
to the Governor and the legislature?3
Under Michigan's Natural Rivers Act of 1970,16c the State Natural
Resources Commission designates a "natural river area" with adjacent
or related lands "as appropriate to the purposes of the designation"
and develops a comprehensive plan for such areas binding upon other
state agencies.'-'3 The Commission may itself acquire land with the
consent of the landowner1's and suggest zoning regulations to in-
(orporated areas. In addition, the Commission has the power to
review any ordinances adopted by an incorporated area. 6 9
Michigan's Inland Lakes and Streams Act of 1972170 requires permits
for dredging and filling in such waters. The permit may be condi-
tional in order to lessen adverse environmental effects. The Michigan
system, therefore, bridges the gap between planning and regulation
by permit.
The New Jersey Legislature has created an agency under the
Hackensack Meadowland Reclamation and Development Act' 7' to
develop a plan for the Hackensack area 7 2 and, if necessary, acquire
land by eminent domain.Y3 The courts have liberally interpreted
the legislation to hold that the denial of development is not a tak-
165. Id. § 13.1842.
166. Id. § 11.501-.516.
167. Id. § 11.503. Parallel legislation is found for Oregon's Willamette River
in ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 390.310-.368 (1973), which provides for the adoption of a
plan by the Land Conservation and Development Commission that shall be the
basis fo r state and local regulation.
168. IMICH. STAT. AN.,. . 11.505 (1973).
169. Id. § 11.508. The Commission is empowered to review the sufficiency of
local regulations, suggest new ones, and adopt them if local regulations are in-
adequate.
170. Id. §§ 11.475(1)-(15).
171. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:17-1 to -86 (Supp. 1974).
172. Id. § 13:17-9. All development must be in accord with the adopted plan
and the Commission has power to review. Id. §§ 13:17-13 to -15.
173. Id. § 13:17-34.
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ing. 74 Moreover, the delegation of sweeping powers to the adminis-
trative agency has been upheld, 7 5 and such power is held to be in
addition to those of other state and local agencies.ll6 In sum, New
Jersey employs an amalgam of planning and permit power to achieve
environmental goals.
Other states are continuing a planning and permit system for wet-
lands protection of certain areas. Connecticut requires an environ-
mental plan for wetlands177 in addition to a permit system.178 Wash-
ington's Shoreland Management Act of 1971171 requires state approval
of Master Programs for shoreline use'8 0 and a system of development
permits, also renewable by the state.' 8' Wisconsin requires its Depart-
ment of Natural Resources to prepare a plan for manageable waters
and shorelands' 8 2 and allows local government to pass regulations to
implement such plans.183 Finally, Delaware prohibits heavy industry
from its coastal areas'8 4 and severely regulates other uses. 8 6
174. East Rutherford Indus. Park, Inc. v. State, 119 N.J. Super. 352, 291 A.2d
588 (L. Div. 1972).
175. Meadowlands Regional Redevelopment Agency v. State, 63 N.J. 35, 304
A.2d 545 (1973).
176. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Authority v. Hackensack Meadowlands, 120
N.J. Super. 118, 293 A.2d 426 (App. Div. 1972).
177. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-8 (1973). The plan, required to be
adopted by September 1, 1972, must be reviewed every two years. These stringent
regulations have generated much controversy as to their validity. Bartlett v.
Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971); Comment, Wetlands
Statutes: Regulation or Taking, 5 CONN. L. REV. 64 (1972).
178. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-28 to -45 (1973).
179. WASH. Rav. CODE §§ 90.58.010-.930 (Supp. 1974).
180. Id. § 90.58.090.
181. Id. § 90.58.140.
182. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 144.26 (1974).
183. Id. § 59.971. This approach has worked adequately despite strong chal-
lenges. In the landmark case of Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201
N.W.2d 761 (1972), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found no taking by the use
of severe local regulations. But in Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 60 Wis. 2d
640, 211 N.W.2d 471 (1973), such regulations were found to lack a reasonable
basis.
184. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7003 (Non. Cum. Supp. 1972). "Heavy in-
dustry use" is comprehensively defined in § 7002(e). The prohibition also extends
to "offshore gas, liquid, or solid bulk transfer facilities," but does not include
public sewage treatment or recycling facilities. Id. § 7003. The "coastal zone"
itself is defined by use of Delaware highways and roads. Id. § 7002(a).
185. Id. § 7004. Except for existing uses, any activity not prohibited must
receive a permit from the State Planner who must consider economic and en-
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It is safe to conclude that shoreland acts combine planning with
regulation and that the more advanced programs stress both functions.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE COIPREHENSIVE PLAN-
SONIE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
The quickening pace of legislative action in the planning field and
the slowly developing judicial acceptance of the comprehensive plan
provide some new directions for planning law. The following is a
list of possibilities for planning that are not mutually exclusive and
flow from current trends.
A. Increased Emphasis on Plan Adoption and Amendment Procedures
Little development has occurred in the area of formal procedural
requirements for the adoption of local plans. SPEA merely required
adoption of a plan by planning commission resolution following a
public hearing. The hearing was to be preceded by notice published
only once in a newspaper of general circulation.1S 6 This format was
followed by most states in their planning enabling legislation. SPEA
provided for adoption of the plan a section at a time'8 7 and for amend-
ments thereto.185 The minimal weight accorded the plan by the
courts' s9 and by SPEA itself'91 is indicative of the low station to which
the plan had fallen.
vironmental impact, aesthetic effect, need for supporting facilities, effect on the
neighborhood, and local comprehensive plans. This represents the total planning
impact of Delaware's Coastal Zone Act. Id. §§ 7001-13. An appeal may be
taken under § 7007 to the Coastal Zone Industrial Control Board, which uses the
same criteria as the State Planner, and to the state superior court under § 7008.
The Delaware legislation parallels the "condemnation-if-a-taking" feature of the
Massachusetts legislation cited in note 163 supra.
186. SPEA, supra note 13, at § 8. The hearing process to SPEA provides a
basis for public comments and possible amendments at the hearing stage. See
note 16 supra.
187. SPEA, supra note 13, at § 8. The piecemeal adoption of a plan allows for
consideration of neighborhoods, other territories, entities or plan elements as
necessary.
188. Id. SPEA does not provide separate means for treating small area replan-
nings such as the quasi-judicial approach taken with respect to small area re-
zonings in Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23(1973). Cf. Marggi v. Ruecker, ................ Ore. App ................. , 533 P.2d 1372
(1975).
189. See Part I supra.
190. See note 16 supra.
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The recent trend, however, is toward an increased emphasis on the
plan and upon procedures for its adoption.10 ' The heavy emphasis
given the plan has led to questions regarding its submission to a
general voter referendum.192 Given the increased emphasis upon the
plan, procedures for its adoption will be closely watched and tested
by litigants.19 3 In addition, though the use of a replanning device
for a small area as a condition precedent to rezoning once passed
comparatively unnoticed9 4 under the "legislative" guise, the evil to
be avoided may be so great' 95 that plan changes for small areas may
be subject to the procedural rules required of small tract rezonings.,'0
B. Greater Expectations of the Planning Process
While SPEA and most other acts provide that plans will do every-
thing necessary to make us healthy, safe and moral,197 historically such
plans were often disregarded as merely advisory opinions. Unfortu-
nately, the belief that the plan amounted to little more than an
opinion withstood the advent of extensive federal funding under
191. E.g., Goal No. 2 of the Oregon Land Conservation and Development
Commission, supra note 4, at 7, adopted December 27, 1974, and effective Jan-
uary 1, 1975, requires: (1) consistency of ordinances, regulations, and actions
with local comprehensive plans; (2) a planning process that stresses factual basis,
alternative choices, and an indication of the choice taken; (3) availability of the
proposed plan and supporting material prior to adoption for public comment;
(4) adoption of a comprehensive plan after a public hearing preceded by notice;
and (5) periodic revision of comprehensive plans after public hearing. See also
Perry, supra note 15.
192. See O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965), in which the court found that a plan, even though not re-
quired, produced an effect on the local community such as to constitute a "legis-
lative act," referrable to the people. But see 36 OP. ORE. ATT'Y GEN. 960 (1974),
in which the Attorney General stated that while a plan had all of the characteris-
tics of legislation, it was not referrable (although implementing ordinances were
referrable).
193. See, e.g., Biske v. City of Troy, 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969),
aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 6 Mich. App. 546, 149 N.W.2d 899 (1967).
194. Malafronte v. Planning & Zoning Bd., 155 Conn. 205, 230 A.2d 606 (1967).
195. See Dalton v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 400, 462 P.2d
199 (1969).
196. The Oregon Court of Appeals came to this conclusion in Marggi v.
Ruecker, ............... Ore. App ................. , 533 P.2d 1372 (1975).
197. See, e.g., SPEA, supra note 13, at § 7, which, among other things, speaks
in terms of providing for "a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development"
to promote "health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity and general
welfare."
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section 701 local planning.1'' Under the 701 program, planning or
engineering consultants often used the same basic plan for several
municipalities.O
The State of California initiated an attempt to standardize the
content of plans by requiring that land use, circulation, housing, and
open space be included in all plans. 20  While these elements had to
be considered, no established guide or procedure was provided to
facilitate such consideration.
Oregon took a different direction. As noted earlier,201 Oregon law
equires the adoption of state-wide planning goals to which local plans,
state and local ordinances, regulations, and actions must conform. 20 2
These goals, adopted in 1974, stress a planning process in lieu of an
end result couched in terms of the general welfare or required plan
elements. For example, agricultural and forestry lands must be in-
%entoricd with a view towards their protection,203 urbanizable areas
must be inventoried and reviewed periodically in conjunction with
capital improvement programs and development activities, 204 and
energy needs must be considered.2 05 The goals themselves are specific
'Ind are referable to an articulated state development policy. Sufficient
fHexibility is provided by allowing change by the Commission without
legislative action.
Oregon's movement toward weighing specific factors as a part of
the planning process is underscored by writers in the planning and
environmental fields, most notably Ian McHarg. 06 He stresses inven-
tories of physical and social resources as a basis for planning choice,
thereby obviating the objection that planning is a matter of opinion.
Adoption of the plan is a matter that should be left to the body
ultimately responsible for making day-to-day enforcement decisions,
198. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1954 § 701, as amended, 42
U S.C. § 4501-32 (1970), provided federal grants for local planning efforts.
199. In Oregon and California the statutory requirement to plan has been a
1on for planners. Whether or not this has led to a commensurate improvement
in the quality of planning remains to be seen.
200. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302 (Deering 1974). For an analysis of this re-
quirement see AB 1301 and Local Land Use Decisions, supra note 107.
201. See text at notes 98-101 supra.
202. ORE. REv. STAT. § 197.250 (1973).
203. Land Conservation and Development Commission, supra note 4, Goal
Nos. 3, 4.
204. Id. at No. 14.
205. Id. at No. 13.
206. See I. McHARo, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969).
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in order to assure that body's commitment to the plan.20 7 If planning
becomes a viable process, the complexity of litigation regarding im-
plementation measures should become easier to handle.208
C. The View of Planning as a Supra-Local Function
As seen in Part II, the trend is toward greater state (and possibly
federal209) government participation in the local planning process.
Such participation may take three approaches: (1) complete or
nearly complete pre-emption of planning by the state (as in Vermont
or Hawaii) ; (2) state participation only in areas or over activities of
unique state concern (as in Florida, California, Oregon, Massachusetts,
New York, and those states that have shoreline acts); or (8) state
participation by developing particularized and flexible planning
criteria against which local plans and implementation actions may
be measured (as in Oregon).
Whatever approach is chosen, it is now clear that the time of full
delegation of planning and land use regulatory powers to local govern-
ments is fast ending. The issue is no longer whether the state will
assume such powers, but when and in what form.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to trace the development of
the comprehensive plan and its impact on land use regulations. While
the nature of the plan and its impact on land use regulations were
cloudy at best in 1955 when Haar first addressed himself to these
issues, considerable activity in the field has recently occurred-especially
on the part of state legislatures.
Although absolute certainty of prediction is never possible, past
developments and present trends are indicative of possible future
actions. We may well anticipate an increase in the number of states
207. In 1973 the Oregon Legislature transferred responsibility for county com-
prehensive plan adoption from the Planning Commission to the local governing
body for precisely these reasons. ORE. REv. STAT. § 215.050 (1973).
208. An excellent argument can be made that the proliferation of environmental
policy acts is due, in large part, to the absence of an adequate planning process.
209. See S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This bill, sponsored by Senator
Henry Jackson, would have provided federal funds to the states for planning if the
planning process met minimal federal requirements. Id. at § 201(a). While it
failed in the House of Representatives, the bill is expected to be re-introduced in
the 94th Congress.
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that require a comprehensive planning process combined with a more
precise articulation of the standards for judging the plan in light of
general state policies. Greater emphasis may be placed upon the plan
than upon regulatory ordinances implementing it. State participation
may increase in activities and over areas in which the state has a
greater interest than localities. WVe might expect to see a shift from
planning composed of designated "elements" to plans that require a
process of rational choice among alternatives. Small changes in plans
may be treated as quasi-judicial acts. And finally, zoning as a plan-
implementation device may be de-emphasized in favor of a discretion-
ary permit system.
If the states mandate a planning process, provide a means of re-
view, and reserve the bulk of planning and implementation decisions
for localities, and if the courts treat land use decisions as they do
other administrative decisions, we may yet achieve a rational and
workable land use system.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/3
